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t h e  FALLACY OF CHINESE 
EXCEPTIONALISM
Anita Chan
In Chinese publications the catchphrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
frequently is used to describe China’s current economic system. The Chinese 
Communist Party provides a loose official definition: “Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics combines the basic principles of scientific socialism with the fac­
tors of building socialism unique to China.”1 The definition essentializes “excep- 
tionalism” by using the word “unique.” This has its pragmatic functions: it is 
conveniently used by Chinese decision makers, bureaucrats, and defenders of 
the greatness of China to ward off having to adopt internationally recognized 
practices. Foreign scholars, too, often endorse the notion of Chinese exceptional- 
ism, though of a different kind. Their choice stems from having a myopic view 
of whatever they are studying about China. So preoccupied and immersed are 
they in a world of Chineseness that they often do not extract themselves and 
ask the question: Are Chinese characteristics also shared by other nations? At a 
scholarly level, Chinese exceptionalism pervades many of the disciplines relating 
to China—in Chinese culture, Chinese history, or Chinese political practices, 
for example.2 Commenting on this, Louise Edwards raises the interesting idea 
of “academic apartheid” when she writes, “The notion that China in some ways 
presents a ‘special case’ has hitherto prevented Chinese history from interact­
ing convincingly with history studies more broadly. But such academic apart­
heid also participates in the tiresome and potentially dangerous pathologizing of 
‘China’ as either especially‘victimized’ in global politics or especially‘mysterious’ 
and incomprehensible.”3 On China’s recent “peaceful rise” William Callahan
l
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expresses a different kind of worry that “Eurocentrism is replaced by Sinocen- 
trism, Westernization is replaced by “Easternization, and American exception­
alism is replaced by Chinese exceptionalism.”4 To my mind the exceptionalism 
paradigm stultifies our search for a deeper understanding of China.
Size of the Chinese Labor Force 
as an Issue of Exceptionalism
If there is one feature that contributes to the notion of Chinese labor excep­
tionalism it is its gargantuan size. As industrialization steamed ahead in China, 
and a workforce of several hundreds of millions emerged from the countryside 
and entered the labor market, the enormity of the impact on international labor 
could not seem anything but exceptional. China’s exceptional size exerts a domi­
nating effect on other poor nations. Newly industrializing countries in the global 
South, especially in Asia, felt obliged to compete by undercutting China’s low 
wages and poor labor standards. Because of the size of its workforce, China’s 
entry into the world’s labor market drove wages to the bottom among poor 
countries.5 Alongside this, the poor working conditions in China’s vast export 
sector attracted unrelenting criticism from the developed world (in particular 
from Western trade unions) as if Chinese workers’ conditions are exceptionally 
abhorrent. In point of fact, many countries’ work conditions, such as in India and 
Pakistan as shown in Chapter 6, are worse than China’s.
China has also been treated as “exceptional” in that it is among a handful of 
countries in the world that still declare themselves “socialist” and that do not 
allow free trade unionism. The international trade union movement in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, under the umbrella of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), was particularly critical of the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) as the handmaiden of, and window dressing for, a Com­
munist state. Despite a toned-down criticism, the pressing issue is still China’s 
violation of the International Tabor Organization’s two core labor standards: 
freedom of association (IFO convention no. 87) and the right to organize and 
engage in collective bargaining (IFO convention no. 98). Admittedly, China is not 
exceptional in not ratifying or practicing these two conventions, and many coun­
tries often violate these principles in practice. In this sense, China is no exception.
Internationally isolated, the ACFTU for its own bureaucratic reasons was 
eager to join the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The annual 
debate among the members of the international organization on how to deal 
with the ACFTU has been intense. It was not until 2007 that the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, renamed the International Trade Union
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Confederation (ITUC), began a dialogue with the ACFTU.6 Today, while the 
ITUC has a total international trade union membership of 175 million workers, 
the ACFTU has more than 239 million members.7 The implications of letting the 
ACFTU join are considerable and invite caution from the ITUC.8
The Chinese, on their part, tend to see the United States as exceptional and 
all-important as a world power. During the two and half decades that I have been 
conducting research on labor in China, I have observed that when the Chinese 
compare themselves with the “Western model,” they mistakenly equate this with 
the “American model.” The Chinese generally do not know that there is also a 
European model, nor, in fact, do the Americans realize the European employ­
ment and labor systems are different from their own. Americans regard their 
labor system as one to be emulated. This view is also prevalent among Chinese 
scholars, who are critical of their own authoritarian labor system and compare 
it unfavorably with that of the United States, in which workers have freedom of 
association, the right to strike, high pay and benefits, and so on. Even Chinese 
trade unionists who are irritated with the American trade unions’ criticism of the 
ACFTU and adamantly defend the “Chinese characteristic” argument sometimes 
also regard the US system as superior. Americans and Chinese perceive them­
selves and each other as exceptional—either positively or negatively so.
From Exceptionalism to Comparativism
A major problem with the concept of Chinese exceptionalism is that it diverts 
researchers’ and analysts’ attention away from looking for fundamental similari­
ties and differences between China and other national systems. True, every nation’s 
labor system has its own social, cultural, political, and historical trajectories. In 
this sense every system is unique, but on examination national systems also share 
commonalities, and some of these may even be universal. By comparing one facet 
of each nation’s system against facets of other systems, we can uncover explana­
tory factors that we might have missed. Comparative analysis leads to insights, 
sharpens our intellect, and, one hopes, reduces bias and prejudice.
To this end, I organized a workshop and invited scholars from four continents 
who specialize in Chinese workers to prepare chapters for this book that either 
compare China with other countries or examine and compare various sectors 
within China. Their work is both cross-national and intranational in outlook. 
The authors of these chapters variously compare Chinese industrial labor in its 
socialist/postsocialist contexts, in a corporatist context, within the context of a 
developing country, and place mainland China alongside Taiwan. Some chap­
ters compare two industries or two regions of China that help to sensitize us
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to variations and complexities within the spectrum of Chinese labor. It is my 
hope that this collection can help to dispel erroneous views about Chinese labor 
held by the international labor community, which is unrealistically optimistic 
about the militancy of Chinese workers, overestimates Chinese migrant workers’ 
ability to organize, is either overenthusiastic or unfairly critical of the impact 
of labor nongovernmental organizations (LNGOs) on China’s labor movement, 
and either demonizes Chinese trade unions or is overly enthusiastic that they are 
reforming themselves. My fundamental intent in this book is to confront those 
interested in China’s labor force and with global labor with an objective and com­
parative view of China. Chinese labor should be analyzed in relative terms that 
will allow us to have a better grasp of the issues and not measure China against 
an ideal Western model. Admittedly, China is a big elephant that requires much 
research and comparative analysis. This collection is only the beginning of such 
an effort.
The book is divided into three sections. The first focuses on historical and 
structural developments in China and compares these with industrial relations 
systems in three other countries. This provides background and historical per­
spective on the trajectories of current systems. The second focuses on external 
factors, such as the role of the state and globalization, on labor regimes and labor 
standards. The third section focuses on efforts to reshape labor regimes and stan­
dards in order to improve the circumstances of workers.
Historical and Structural Developments
A country’s present economic and employment systems are the products of 
incessant change. The two chapters included in part 1 examine these forces of 
change and their effect on current institutions while comparing the Chinese sys­
tem with the experiences of other countries. In chapter 1, the German scholar 
Boy Liithje compares German and Japanese joint-venture firms in China. In 
chapter 2, four US-based scholars, Mingwei Liu, Frederick Scott Bentley, Mary 
Huong Thi Evans, and Susan J. Schurman, compare the American and Chinese 
industrial relations systems. Both chapters invoke the concept of state corporat­
ism. Chinese corporatism has been a contentious subject discussed by Western 
scholars for some time. The main debate has been whether China is a corporat­
ist state and, if so, whether this has been eroded and decentralized through the 
emergence of civil society.9
Liithje enters this debate from the framework of “varieties of capital­
ism” that dichotomizes capitalist systems into “liberal market economies” and
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“coordinated market economies.”10 Liithje subscribes to the notion that China, 
Germany, and Japan share features of corporatist structures with coordinated 
market economies in contradistinction to the neoliberal market economies of 
the United States and Great Britain. However, finding the framework’s empha­
sis on institutions too static a model, he privileges a notion of the dynamics of 
change that evolves into various types of corporatism and varieties of capital­
ism. Corporatism and capitalism, as he sees them, are constantly changing as 
they face the challenges of globalization. To illustrate what he sees as the fluidity 
of systems, he uses Sino-German and Sino-Japanese automobile manufacturing 
ventures in China as case studies. He shows that nationally distinctive manage­
ment styles manifest themselves and affect industrial relations within these Ger­
man and Japanese joint ventures. He explains why Sino-German joint ventures 
have more harmonious industrial relations in China than Sino-Japanese joint 
ventures, which experience more confrontation in their supply chains. He also 
concludes that the shape of labor policies in China asserts itself in all of these 
joint ventures.
While Liithje argues that institutional structures are continually changing, 
Liu and his coauthors identify the driving force of change as globalization. This 
brings us to the other major variant of capitalism, the neoliberal Anglo-Saxon 
variant that Liithje refers to. Liu and his coauthors argue that the American 
and Chinese industrial relations systems are converging. In the United States, a 
declining and divided trade union movement is stymied by labor laws that osten­
sibly allow freedom of association but in essence restrict such freedom, while 
strike laws allow strikes but make organizing strikes extremely difficult. Worse 
yet, US trade unions are not able to get Congress to pass new laws that can arrest 
the unions’ decline. The democratic political system works against such efforts. 
By contrast, in China the state and the ACFTU have been able to pass pro-labor 
legislation in the past two decades, but because of the weak observance of laws in 
China, much of the legislation has not been implemented locally. Because of the 
lax enforcement of these laws, Chinese workers have lost out under globalization. 
Both US and Chinese workers suffer the brunt of “flexibilization” of labor, with 
precarious job tenure increasing at a rapid rate.
Liu and his coauthors introduce the concept of “converging divergence.” 
Having adopted a market economy and integrating it with the global economy, 
China is converging toward the American model; at the same time, both nations’ 
workforces are witnessing diverging domestic conditions, resulting in increasing 
socioeconomic inequality. In labor relations, the big difference between the two 
countries is that Chinese trade unions are under state control while US trade 
unions are autonomous. Nonetheless, under the power of global capitalism these
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two “exceptional” nations share something in common: huge sectors of unorga­
nized labor and trade unions that are struggling for legitimacy in the eyes of the 
working class and for survival as institutions.
To a certain extent, Luthje and Liu look at China’s industrial relations system 
under slightly different lights. Luthje emphasizes empirical evidence of corporat­
ist Chinese structures as well as measures found in coordinated economies, and 
he observes that state intervention through the increasing enactment of laws and 
regular increases in the minimum wage help contain labor unrest. In contrast, Liu 
and his colleagues emphasize the neoliberal aspects of the Chinese system. Which 
scenario approximates the real situation better—Chinese labor being somewhat 
protected by the state or a laxly regulated Chinese industrial labor force in free 
fall? This is a controversial question. Attempts at answers can be found in the 
next section, which is devoted to examining indicators that reflect the effect of 
state policies on labor conditions, in comparison with other countries and within 
different parts of China itself.
The Role of the State, Globalization, 
and Labor Standards
Through the use of empirical studies, authors in part 2 of the book examine and 
compare the impact of globalization on labor standards in China as against its 
impact on poorer countries such as Vietnam, India, and Pakistan. Globalization 
is an important driver that these less-developed countries all have to contend 
with as transnational capital scours the world for cheap labor. How are Chinese 
workers’ livelihoods and work conditions affected? How do different group­
ings of Chinese workers working in different parts of the country, in different 
sectors of the economy, and living under the shadow of local governments and 
firms competing to offer the best investment climate sustain themselves? How 
do workers in other developing countries contend with the competition emanat­
ing from China? Kevin Lin in chapter 3 and Florian Butollo in chapter 4 com­
pare labor standards within China under the impact of globalization. Kaxton Siu 
in chapter 5 and I along with Hong Xue, Peter Lund-Thomsen, Khalid Nadvi, 
and Navjote Khara in chapter 6 compare China’s labor standards with those in 
three poorer countries. In these four chapters the authors identify the various 
key factors and players in the manufacturing process that affect labor standards. 
The information in these chapters makes clear that two fundamental factors are 
largely responsible for shaping labor standards—the state and the ubiquitous 
force of globalization.
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In China, the state has been the main actor organizing and restructuring the 
country’s economy to integrate it with the global economy. Lin shows how the 
state, in response to competitive global market forces, has allowed state-owned 
enterprises to adopt a two-tier workforce system. Butollo shows how, at the local 
level, the Guangdong government played a major role in facilitating technologi­
cal upgrading. Siu analyzes in detail the labor laws enacted by the Chinese and 
Vietnamese governments that ensure that their minimum-wage policies do not 
undermine their competitiveness in the international labor market. Similarly, my 
colleagues and I show that in China, Pakistan, and India the governments passed 
labor laws and implemented policies that influenced their respective interna­
tional market share in the production of soccer balls. In sum, the visible hands 
of state laws and policies and the competitive pull of globalization have played 
critical roles in shaping the industrial relations systems in the countries exam­
ined in part 2.
In addition, Lin’s study of Chinese state-sector workers and their working 
conditions focuses on a major economic sector in China that has drawn little 
academic interest after the massive layoffs of tens of millions of state-enterprise 
workers at the height of industrial restructuring in the late 1990s. Lin shows 
how, after the end of lifetime employment for Chinese state workers and the 
introduction of a labor-contract system, state workers became threatened by pre­
carious employment, lower labor standards, and eroded benefits, to the extent 
that their conditions are converging toward those suffered by Chinese migrant 
workers. He discovered that workers hired directly by state enterprises still enjoy 
some of the paternalistic legacy of the previous planned-economy period, with 
job security, good fringe benefits, and entitlements. Their work hours are com­
paratively shorter and their wages a bit higher than those of migrant workers in 
China’s export sector. But during the past decade state enterprises have created 
a two-tier workforce. There is now a rapidly growing population of “dispatch 
workers” (temporary workers), estimated to be as many as sixty million, who 
are hired through agencies. They work side by side with regular workers doing 
the same kind of work but for lower pay and fewer benefits. This large group of 
precariously situated workers have one-year or two-year contracts—or none at 
all. This is the most significant new factor in the expanding flexibility in employ­
ment described by Luthje and Liu. In this sense, there is convergence between 
China, the United States, and even Germany.11 The Chinese working class as a 
whole is losing out in this turn of events, while the Chinese middle classes and 
the ruling elite are big gainers, which leads to increasing socioeconomic dispari­
ties. Lin argues that the long-held view that there is a divide between workers in 
state enterprises and migrant workers in the private and foreign-funded firms is
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no longer entirely valid. It is time to consider the changes these two main groups 
of workers are experiencing as interrelated processes of transformation—the 
remaking of the Chinese working class.
There is a popular view that as a country moves through a labor-intensive 
industrial stage to a more advanced stage of industrial technology, there will be a 
tandem upgrading of workers’ skills leading to overall socioeconomic improve­
ments. A better-educated and better-trained workforce that demands higher 
wages will pull the rest of the less-skilled workforce along with it. Butollo’s com­
parison of the garment and LED lighting industries in Guangdong Province 
shows, however, that socioeconomic upgrading does not necessarily follow in 
the wake of government-initiated technological upgrading. The upgrading and 
automation of the two industries reveal important differences in their respec­
tive organization of production, upgrading strategies, skills, and wage systems. 
Yet in both industries there is a bifurcation of manual assembly-line tasks and 
knowledge-intensive tasks (in management, design, R & D, etc.). The greater the 
automation, the more repetitive, de-skilled, and boring is the work on the line. 
Workers are subjected to either labor intensification or wage stagnation. Working 
conditions are becoming so unattractive in Guangdong that, after weighing the 
slightly higher wages there against the advantages of working in their home prov­
inces, many migrant workers prefer to stay put, which has led to a labor shortage 
in Guangdong. But firms there still refuse to raise wages. Instead, they prefer to 
relocate to low-wage areas either further inland in China or abroad. Upgrading 
strategies therefore have provided very limited benefits for manual workers even 
in technologically sophisticated enterprises. Butollo concludes that this trend will 
generate greater labor unrest in Guangdong Province.
On the cross-national level, we might surmise that the reactions of China 
and Vietnam to globalization would be quite similar. Both countries remain 
under one-party rule. Their so-called market socialism is designed to keep wages 
competitively low in the export sector to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
While this is generally true, Siu, based on two surveys of eight hundred work­
ers in the garment industry in China and Vietnam, reveals that both Chinese 
and Vietnamese workers are going through hard times, albeit differently. Chinese 
workers have more than enough to eat but face harsh working conditions, par­
ticularly in terms of excessively long hours; Vietnamese workers are not forced to 
work as many overtime hours, but they have to struggle to meet their basic needs 
for food and shelter. Siu raises the question: Why do foreign investors not make 
Vietnamese workers work as many hours as Chinese workers? His analysis shows 
that this is owing to a bundle of interrelated factors: differences in each coun­
try’s labor laws, factory overtime policy and compensation arrangements, trade
INTRODUCTION 9
union attitudes, and workers’ readiness to go on strike. We are presented with a 
situation in which globalization has forced national governments to undertake 
strategies that have engendered different outcomes.
In a similar way, in the chapter that I and my colleagues have coauthored on 
soccer ball production in China, India, and Pakistan, we find that the role of the 
state has been very important in shaping industrial relations and labor standards. 
All three countries have been competing to attract FDI in this industry; all are at 
the end of the global production chain. The main drivers are brand-name corpo­
rations that compete against one another to maximize profits and cut costs. Of 
the three countries, China is the only one that has the capacity to prevent a free 
fall to the bottom in terms of working conditions and wages. By using its national 
labor laws, it has been able to maintain and improve wage levels. Pakistan and 
India, in contrast, passed laws that diminish the state’s regulatory functions. In 
both countries these laws have encouraged capital to establish small workshops 
rather than large production facilities, which in effect excludes the majority of 
the manufacturing workforce from legal protections. This has resulted in a pro­
liferation of home workers laboring in isolated settings, which is detrimental to 
the development of collective awareness and collective actions. Over time, the 
compensation of these home workers has fallen below a living wage. With par­
ents unable to afford school fees, children of home workers have to stay home. 
The only solution for these impoverished parents is to put their children to work 
stitching balls for a few rupees a day. Both the Indian and Pakistani governments 
and capital have held on to the belief that cheap labor, even child labor, provides 
their most effective competitive edge, and they have had no qualms in taking this 
low-road strategy. They have become unwilling and, for the most part, incapable 
of upgrading technology and modernizing their production organization and 
improving the efficiency of their workforce. In contrast, the Chinese govern­
ment is keen to promote and facilitate technological investment and automa­
tion, as Butollo describes in his chapter. By the time the Indians and Pakistanis 
realized their short-sightedness, they had already lost out to China in the soccer 
ball industry. Sometimes the Chinese state has also drawn on unconventional 
sources of vulnerable labor to reduce labor costs in this highly labor-intensive, 
competitive industry—prison labor, which generates much higher productivity 
than does child labor.
These four chapters on labor standards inform us that globalization is unques­
tionably a main driver to the bottom but that nations can, to a certain extent, 
adapt and react to the situation, and they do so in ways that vary depending on 
their capacity and willingness. In global terms, corporatist arrangements and 
industrial policies as practiced by China and Vietnam can sometimes arrest the
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exploitation of their workforce, more than can be done in neoliberal states such 
as India and Pakistan. They try to maintain a balancing act. A “socialist” state like 
China, however, can also engage in a proliferation of precarious hiring practices 
in the state sector, as illustrated in Lins chapter. States cannot be relied on to 
nurture and protect their workforce from being trampled on by international 
and local capital.
Trade Unions, NGOs, Collective Bargaining, 
and Labor Activism
In a comparative context, Chinese workers’ conditions can be better or worse 
than others, subject to the choice of comparators. The empirical evidence pre­
sented in the final three chapters that make up part 3 suggests that a difficult 
road lies ahead.
That the ACFTU does not act as a trade union that represents workers’ interests 
but as an arm of the party-state has been widely accepted by students of Chinese 
labor. Feng Chen, for instance, has seen the industrial relations system in China 
as a quadripartite system (of state, employer, trade union, and labor) rather than 
the usually described tripartite system (minus labor) in which the ACFTU is a 
fourth actor but with interests separate from those of workers.12 Expectations are 
low that the ACFTU will ultimately become a genuine representative of labor. Yet 
there are also some reasons for optimism—labor NGOs (LNGOs) are taking up the 
challenge abandoned by the official government-run trade unions. In chapter 7 
Chris King-chi Chan and Yu-bin Chiu demonstrate the possibilities. They docu­
ment how workers and NGOs in Taiwan in the 1980s were able to ride the crest 
of a nationwide political movement that successfully turned a one-party corpo­
ratist political system into a multiparty democracy and in the process provided 
an opportunity for a one-party, state-controlled trade union system to turn into 
an autonomous trade union system. In both China today and Taiwan before the 
1980s, LNGOs have emerged to provide workers with services and support that 
should have been the function of trade unions. The authors lay out in detail 
how Taiwanese LNGOs struggled under a corporatist political framework and 
how they overcame difficulties. They understood the importance of financial 
independence by relying on indigenous funding. They had the courage to turn 
to political agendas because they saw that labor’s economic struggles were part of 
a broader political democratic struggle. In contrast, LNGOs in today’s China are 
reliant on foreign financial support. They are also generally “depoliticitized,” as 
pointed out by the authors, which restricts their activities to the space prescribed
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by the law, and they do not organize across workplaces. The authors recognize 
that the political situation in Taiwan in the era of its political transition was more 
open than in the People’s Republic of China today, but they still believe much can 
be learned from the Taiwanese LNGO experience.
This is an interesting possibility worth pursuing. Having worked with Chinese 
LNGOs, I am aware of the problems, but Chan and Chiu have pointed out a pos­
sible route to moving forward. Yet much also depends on Chinese workers’ con­
sciousness. Chinese workers are not as willing as the Vietnamese to stage strikes. A 
2013 study by Feng Chen and Mengxiao Tang concludes that Chinese workers are 
still at a stage of legal rights-based protests given that their demands are simply 
for employers to comply with what is legally due them under China’s labor laws. 
Interest-based demands that go beyond seeking legal compliance—for instance, 
to receive wages and conditions that are higher than the legal minimum—have 
only just emerged.13 The massive strike of more than forty thousand migrant 
workers at an enormous Taiwanese footwear factory, Yue Yuen, in Guangdong 
Province in April 2014 is the biggest strike ever among Chinese workers at a 
foreign-funded factory. The strike began with a demand for employer contribu­
tions to workers’ social insurance (not unpaid wages, which is more common), 
and this continued to be the core demand.14 The almost two-week-long strike 
ended with fierce police suppression outside and inside the factory buildings, 
management intimidation, and damage to workers’ morale and solidarity. Ulti­
mately little was gained from the upheaval, and multinational buyers quickly 
shifted part of production either to poorer parts of China or to neighboring 
developing countries.15 The most important demand, along with the size and 
length of the strike, indicate that migrant workers have notched up another step 
in rights awareness. A few weeks earlier, workers at a Walmart store drew inter­
national attention when they responded to an unannounced closing of the store 
by laying out compensation demands that went beyond what was legally due to 
them as a severance settlement. The workers demanded that Walmart double the 
amount of severance pay for each month of employment; compensate workers 
for expenses incurred from moving house and transferring children to nearby 
schools when taking up the job; and provide three times compensation for next 
year’s Chinese New Year holiday leave that had not yet been taken.16
What role has the Chinese trade union played, and what can be revealed by 
examining the union from a comparative perspective? In the first decade of 
this century, there were a few instances when the ACFTU made some efforts to 
show it was reforming itself. The most surprising example was when the ACFTU 
secretly set up democratically elected workplace unions in 2006 at more than a 
dozen Walmart stores. But this democratic unionization effort lasted only about
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two months.17 Since then, trade union chairs have been appointed from among 
the stores’ human resource managers or middle-ranking store supervisory staff.18 
Work conditions have degenerated to a level similar to that in US Walmart super­
stores, with fulltime workers being turned into part-timers to avoid the employ­
er’s contribution to social security and medical benefits; compensation barely 
above minimum wage; enforcement of “voluntary” overtime; and so on. The 
turnover rate of store workers is so high that newer workers have no knowledge 
of the once-promising incident of 2006.19 Recently a few veteran store workers 
who had participated in the election of union branches in 2006 stepped for­
ward with the support of LNGOs to protest deteriorating conditions, while the 
Shenzhen trade union and its lower-level unions stood on the sidelines or at best 
served as mediators. How organized and widespread are such actions is difficult 
to gauge, but this is the first sign that these older workers have the capacity to 
muster independent actions.20
Despite the failure of local trade unions to represent workers and protect their 
constituents’ rights, the ACFTU has expressed interest in building up a work­
place system of “collective consultation.” When a foreign trade union engages in 
exchange visits or study tours, the ACFTU sometimes asks the foreign union del­
egates to run collective bargaining training sessions. This type of request, as far 
as 1 know, began in the mid-1990s when the Australian Ministry of Labour and 
the Chinese government agreed to a program that sent trainers to China from 
Australian unions to impart the Australian collective bargaining experience. Yet 
this kind of program did not help advance the state of Chinese collective consul­
tation for almost two decades.
Since the Nanhai Honda strike in 2010, the ACFTU has shown renewed inter­
est in setting up a collective consultation system with the express purpose of 
containing wildcat strikes. It is unclear how serious this interest is among union 
officials in various parts of China. Guangdong is the region that is best known 
as being proactively concerned with labor rights and the launching of new pro­
grams (despite the Shenzhen trade union’s inaction during the Walmart workers’ 
protests). Both the Guangdong Provincial Federation of Trade Unions (GDFTU) 
and the Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions (GZFTU) have engaged for­
eign trade unions to run training sessions on collective bargaining. Lively details 
of these training sessions are documented by Katie Quan in chapter 8. Quan, a 
Berkeley academic, was formerly a union organizer and trainer. She conducted 
collective bargaining training sessions in Vietnam during the same time period as 
she was running similar sessions in Guangdong. In her chapter she compares the 
receptiveness of the two countries’ union staffs to new ideas and their willingness 
and ability to conduct collective bargaining on behalf of workers.
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Quan points out interesting differences in each country’s national-level 
approach to collective bargaining and the differences between their trade union 
officials. The role-playing collective bargaining sessions that she conducted in 
Vietnam were boisterous and engaged, while in China they understood what they 
were supposed to do but were ineffectual in involving workers. These observa­
tions are revealing of the discernible difference between the two countries’ local 
trade union officials. Vietnamese officials feel a sense of personal involvement in 
their representation of workers that seems to be lacking in Chinese trade union 
officials.
What could be the reason for this difference? Rank-and-file mobilization and 
escalating the stakes are normally seen as portending a strike. Does the absence of 
a stated right to strike in China inhibit Chinese trade unions from representing 
workers in earnest during such sessions? This is an argument I have heard several 
Chinese union officials and labor advocates make. Would the existence of such a 
right help? Going on strike is neither legal nor illegal in China, and a decision to 
strike is usually a last resort in a bargaining process. Given China’s current situ­
ation, the legal protection of striking is not a deciding factor in whether workers 
strike. Vietnam’s labor code permits strikes and contains protected strike clauses. 
Yet strikes in Vietnam have not been organized and/or led by workplace unions.21 
A strike law therefore does not determine whether or not a union will be willing 
to bargain for workers. The Vietnamese trade union officials’ shouted demands 
during Quan’s training sessions when acting out their collective bargaining roles 
had little to do with potential threats to initiate a strike. Normally their heated 
bargaining with management arises only after workers have gone out on strike 
on their own. Vietnamese workers have not depended on the unions to organize 
their strikes as mandated by the law, nor have workers considered the law to 
be of any relevance to their industrial actions—they do not even consider the 
consequences of violating the strike law. Neither do the authorities take the law 
seriously, because workers do not get arrested for violating the law when they 
launch wildcat strikes. In other words, the legal right to strike in Vietnam thus far 
has done little to instill in workers a mentality of legal compliance or of seeking 
trade union help to resolve grievances through collective bargaining or, from the 
authorities’ point of view, of containing strikes.
Indeed, while laws granting a right to strike have been much heralded in dem­
ocratic countries that have such laws, this does not mean that workers there can 
more readily go on strike. To demonstrate why this is the case, Sean Cooney and 
Thomas Nice in chapter 9 compare and analyze from a jurisprudential stand­
point the situations in China and Australia. Australia is often seen as having rela­
tively strong trade unions compared to, say, the United States. Cooney and Nice
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use Australia as a comparator because for most of the twentieth century strikes 
were common but illegal in Australia. Only in the 1990s did Australia pass leg­
islation providing a right to take “protected [strike] action.” Yet the Workplace 
Relations Act of 1996 created a demarcation between protected industrial actions 
and those that are not.22 Comparing the period before and after the enactment 
of the law, the authors show that the right to “protected action” has had the effect 
of reducing the scope of industrial actions in practice because of intervention 
by the government, but they also think “that the creation of a right to strike is 
an open-ended, fraught, and ambiguous process, not necessarily an unqualified 
benefit to workers.”
Cooney and Nice use a roundabout means to show the possible problems that 
China may encounter if a law legalizing strikes were to be enacted. They show 
how the Australian law falters in protecting strikes by measuring it against the 
ILO’s conventions, in respect to both jurisprudence and practice. When viola­
tions of the law are not penalized it is only because of the authorities’ willingness 
to overlook the infringement. Sometimes common practice and political consid­
erations prevail over legality. But such largesse can also easily be rescinded under 
elected governments that are antilabor.
The Vietnamese and Australian experiences can serve as a guide. In Vietnam 
the unions are weak, even if willing. In Australia the law was passed only after 
years of hard struggle by relatively strong trade unions. Even so, the law ended 
up restricting industrial actions in Australia, while such a law on strikes had no 
effect in Vietnam. Were such a law to be passed in China, therefore, it cannot be 
assumed that it would better enable workers to strike nor that the currently inef­
fectual official Chinese trade unions would be better able to bargain effectively 
for workers. In the last few years, there have been discussions among Chinese 
decision makers and labor-relations scholars as to whether there should be such 
a law. The policy-driven perspective is that a strike law might be able to regulate 
strikes, with grievances channeled into a collective bargaining system. The Chi­
nese labor-advocacy perspective is that workers should enjoy the right to strike 
and the right to genuine collective bargaining. A strike law if enacted would possi­
bly narrow this right, as described by Cooney and Nice, similar to how such a law 
works against labor in Australia. In a somewhat similar manner, the Vietnamese 
strike law makes the procedure for going on a protected strike so laborious 
that such a strike would be bound to fail. The labor advocates’ conception of a 
strike law, in contrast, would include as little restriction and as much protection 
of strike actions as possible. Given the current situation in China, despite the 
ACFTU’s past record of taking a pro-labor stance in the passage of labor laws, I am 
inclined to think that the law, if enacted, would not be to the advantage of labor.
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For the time being, it seems that the Guangdong provincial government and 
trade union, more than institutions elsewhere, have debated this prospective 
law and seriously tried to learn more about collective bargaining. The central 
government has not put it on the national agenda for deliberation. Possibly it 
is wary that such a law could lead to more wildcat strikes rather than union-led 
regulated strikes. Even in Guangdong, reputed to be the most liberal province in 
China, labor protests are often suppressed and the protesters arrested. In 2014 
twelve hospital security guards were charged with criminal offenses and jailed 
for peacefully protesting unfair severance compensation. Protesters have been 
jailed before, but formally charging them with committing a criminal offence is 
unprecedented.23 This new development does not bode well for Chinese workers.
Is there a chance that the ACFTU will reform itself and act locally more on 
behalf of workers? Tim Pringle provides a prognosis in chapter 10 in which he 
compares labor and trade unions in contemporary Russia and China. Pringle’s 
account shows how difficult it has been for the former official Soviet trade union, 
and even for the new alternative unions born after 1990, to become indepen­
dent representatives of Russian workers. The Soviet official trade union, now 
renamed the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR), still 
has the largest membership and has opted for a “social partnership” with the state 
and capital. I would characterize this as a watered-down corporatist relationship. 
Union membership has shrunk, and the private sector is left largely unorganized, 
despite an environment that allows freedom of association and recognition of a 
right to strike. By no means is this a uniquely Russian problem. A subdued work­
ing class and trade unions are found across the postsocialist Eastern European 
countries,24 including Poland, where Solidarity threw the first monkey wrench 
into the Communist-era authoritarian corporatist institutions. Worker agency 
initially flourished, but it quickly subsided with increasing political and economic 
freedom in the 1990s. The new alternative trade unions have faced difficulties in 
developing in this context. With workers not taking up the mantle, trade unions 
have remained relatively quiescent vis-a-vis the powers that be. As Pringle aptly 
observes about China, it is workers’ agency that is the hope for change.
Will the Fate of Chinese Labor be Exceptional?
I hope that this book will convince readers that China is not exceptional and 
that there is much value in using a comparative perspective as an analytical tool. 
Many “Chinese characteristics” can also be found elsewhere. Chinese corporat­
ism shares common features with other corporatist states. Chinese “socialism”
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shares communalities with Vietnamese “socialism” and postsocialist capitalism. 
The Chinese trade union is controlled by the state, but this is by no means a 
unique phenomenon.
There are positive elements in Chinese industrial labor that should be recog­
nized. The state is suppressive, but the Chinese labor laws in themselves are quite 
protective of labor interests. The Labor Contract Law, passed in 2007, had the 
purpose of resolving the growing problem of using temp-agency workers, but 
it had the unintended consequence of increasing the use of short-term flexible 
labor.25 To plug loopholes in the law, an amendment was passed in 2013.26 It is 
too early to tell whether the revised law has helped to contain or even reduce the 
use of temp-agency workers, but the central government and the ACFTU have 
tried to alleviate the problem. The annual substantial increases in the minimum 
wage in China for the past decade is also unusual compared with the situation in 
other Asian developing countries (except for Vietnam). As a further positive sign, 
in many developing countries workers in special economic zones are not allowed 
to belong to trade union branches, but in China special economic zones are not 
exempted from the labor laws. True, one can argue that it makes little differ­
ence whether Chinese workers in economic zones have the right to be unionized 
because the only legal trade union does not normally represent them. But there 
exists in China the potential for legal statutes already in place to yield positive 
effects. For instance, an increasing number of workers have been able to take 
employers to court and successfully enforce pay and work conditions that are 
specified by law, which had previously been widely ignored. One could dismiss 
all the relatively positive trends as motivated by an effort to pre-empt industrial 
upheaval. But, whatever the reason, increasingly, Chinese labor laws have pro­
duced positive consequences.
The Chinese authorities, eager to channel grievances through the legal system, 
publicize with great fanfare every time a new labor law has been passed during 
the past twenty years. They have printed the entire law on the front pages of 
newspapers and highlighted the amended articles of the laws; they have even run 
quiz shows on television to propagate the message. More and more workers have 
become aware of their legal rights, thanks in part to the LNGOs’ years of patient 
work in spreading the details of labor laws. True, the NGOs’ advice to workers 
to go to court to address grievances often has kept worker action within the 
confines of the legal system, rather than promoting other types of initiatives to 
improve their conditions. For instance, Chinese workers have yet to confront the 
government over increasing the minimum wage or to pass new statutes by going 
into the streets, as have Indonesian, Cambodian, and Bangladeshi workers. Still, 
each time Chinese workers, either individually or in small groups, have taken
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a n  employer to court to enforce their legal rights or recoup unpaid wages it is a 
le a rn in g  experience and a process of self-affirmation and development.
Starting in 2010, an increasing number of factory workers began to move 
toward engaging in strikes for higher wages and better conditions beyond what 
is stipulated by law. Several strikes have even called for democratic elections of 
workplace union branches. A well-publicized strike that made precisely these 
demands erupted at a large Honda parts plant in Guangzhou in 2010 and quickly 
spread to several other factories. Previously, strikes had largely confined them­
selves to protesting nonpayment of wages and the like. The new types of strike are 
still confined to a small minority of companies in a sea of many tens of thousands 
of Chinese factories; but Chinese industry appears to be in the throes of rapidly 
changing circumstances.
This chapter began with a discussion of Chinese exceptionalism and noted that 
the claims about the exceptionalism of China’s labor force stem from its gargan­
tuan size. Whether or not such a claim to exceptionalism has real merit, it is true 
that size can matter in terms of impact. In China, as noted, the Yue Yuen 2014 
strike involved 48,000 workers. Not many places in the world have concentra­
tions of such a massive workforce. Foxconn, a Taiwanese electronics company that 
produces for Apple, Dell, Nokia, and others is even bigger. It employs more than 
200,000 workers at one of its factory compounds in Shenzhen and 200,000 more 
in another location in Shenzhen just an hour’s drive away. Foxconn workers have 
started to become restive, engaging in several small strikes and stoppages, and 
Foxconn’s executives have been openly worried. One wonders about the impact if 
one day these 400,000 Shenzhen Foxconn workers were to engage in an industrial 
action for higher pay and genuine representation and if this action then spread to 
the 1.3 million Foxconn workers across China. It would be an exceptionally large 
strike against one company to be sure, but the nature of the demands is not at all 
exceptional. They are commonplace around the world. To better understand the 
situation of Chinese workers today, and what the future holds, we need to place 
China in comparative perspective.
1e x p o r t in g  c o r p o r a t is m ?
German and Japanese Transnationals’ Regimes 
of Production in China
Boy Luthje
Both Germany and Japan have been referred to as potential models for Chinese 
labor-policy reform. In both countries, labor relations appear to be politically 
coordinated and socially sustainable, which seems to be more in line with China’s 
socialist market economy than liberal market models. Such analysis is based on 
theories of corporatism in the tradition of Philippe Schmitter and of “varieties of 
capitalism” (VoC) under comparative institutionalist perspectives,1 which depict 
Germany and Japan as major examples of “coordinated market economies” 
that represent alternatives to neoliberalism and more socially inclusive ways of 
capitalist restructuring.2 In the face of the accelerated restructuring of global 
production and labor relations and the ongoing financial and economic crisis, 
however, there are reasons to doubt the viability of such concepts and their 
applicability to China.
First of all, German and Japanese labor relations are quite different from each 
other. Indeed, the Japanese model of lean and flexible work organizations with 
relatively weak trade unions has long been seen as a threat to corporatist cen­
tralized trade unions in Germany and other European countries. Second, basic 
forms of labor-management cooperation in Germany and Japan have been seri­
ously undermined by globalization and the neoliberal restructuring of the world 
economy. Third, multinational corporations and their subcontractors tend to 
adapt to the variety of forms of labor relations in foreign countries, often ex­
ploiting the competition between nationally shaped systems of labor relations 
and social regulations. Finally, in the light of labor conflicts in China, especially
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the wave of strikes in the automobile sector in the south in 2010, the labor sys­
tems of German and Japanese companies operating joint ventures (JVs) in Chi­
na seem to have produced very different outcomes. Notably, most of the strikes 
occurred in Japanese-owned or co-owned companies or their suppliers, such as 
Honda or Denso, while German multinationals and their suppliers did not expe­
rience comparable labor troubles.
Against this background and using Japan as a comparator, I would like to 
take a closer look at the production regimes of leading German multinationals 
in China and discuss whether and how German-style corporatist labor practices 
have been transplanted into the Chinese context and what specific trajectories of 
conflict and social development are arising. I begin with an examination of the 
concept of “corporatism.” In the second and third sections, I look at the German 
postwar social contract and its differences from that of Japan and the former’s 
transformation in the context of globalization. I then analyze the production 
regimes of some flagship German companies in the Chinese context. I conclude 
the chapter with a comparative look at production regimes of German and Japa­
nese automobile companies and some lessons regarding the growing labor un­
rest and reforms of labor policies in China.
“German ” “Japanese/’ and “Chinese”
Labor Relations Models
The notion of VoC has become a point of reference in theories of political 
economy, industrial organization, innovation, labor relations, and related fields 
that study the various patterns and pathways of economic, social, and politi­
cal regulation in capitalist societies, bound together and competing against one 
another in the world market.3 A common theme has been the difference between 
“market-liberal” types of capitalism, such as those of the United States and Great 
Britain, and “coordinated market economies,” such as those of western Europe 
and Japan.4 The latter are particularly characterized by corporatist labor rela­
tions regimes—that is, tripartite cooperation between capital, labor, and govern­
ment in many different forms and at various levels—from company, industry, or 
regional to national or supranational (e.g., the European Union).
Literature on China’s economy and its rebalancing in the wake of the global 
economic crisis has referred to the VoC approach,5 which goes beyond tradition­
al views of transformation from “plan” to “market.” A more profound sociologi­
cal understanding of this phenomenon is that the transformation of formerly 
planned economies in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China has actually 
not resulted in the establishment of “pure” market economies. Instead, complex
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recombinations of property relations have taken place,6 in which various forms 
of private capital (national and multinational), state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
collective-owned enterprises, as well as “hybrid” types of property (e.g., manage­
ment buyouts of former SOEs) have created new sets of social relations under the 
capitalist market.7 As Polanyi, Weber, and Marx explained, capitalism is always 
embedded in complex sets of social relations and institutions that modify the 
specific functioning of the market, capital accumulation, and social control.
The VoC approach has played an important, if not explicit, role in the litera­
ture on Chinese labor relations. Chinese and Western analysts alike refer to theo­
ries of neocorporatism, as laid out in Schmitter’s now classic 1974 article.8 China 
is seen as a developmental state akin to the key industrial economies of East Asia, 
including Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, which are run in a markedly differ­
ent manner from Anglo-American market liberalism but display some similari­
ties with more state-dominated systems in western Europe. Post-Mao China has 
been described as a model of state-corporatism,9 as opposed to the more lib­
eral or “societal” forms of corporatism prevalent in its genuinely capitalist Asian 
counterparts. Hopes have been expressed that China’s economic transformation 
will be accompanied by a transition from state to societal corporatism that is 
built on the institutionalization of basic property and social rights as well as 
some forms of collective representation for the working population under mar­
ket conditions. Corporatist relationships in China are particularly embedded in 
the system of workers’ representation in SOEs, the staff and workers congress, 
and enterprise unions; sectors governed by such relations are characterized as the 
core of China’s industrial system.10
Institutionalist theories of corporatism, however, have often been criticized 
for their functionalism and their inability to make sense of the complex dynam­
ics between politics and economics and the underlying power relationships be­
tween social classes and movements in modern capitalist societies.11 Similarly, 
the static juxtaposition of market-liberal and coordinated capitalisms has been 
questioned. This approach draws the line between two opposing camps in 
world capitalism but does not leave much room for understanding institutional 
changes under accelerated globalization. In the wake of the world financial and 
economic crisis of 2008-9, some authors are returning to basic questions about 
capitalism and its limited ability to regulate social relations, rather than compar­
ing the advantages and disadvantages of various forms of capitalism.12
In a remarkable book on the postwar industrial systems of the United States, 
Germany, and Japan, Gary Herrigel has shown how new forms of capitalist or­
ganization in industries, firms, and workplaces have been created by strategic ac­
tors after recombining the advantages and disadvantages of national systems of 
innovation and socioeconomic regulation.13 The resulting trajectories fit neither
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neoliberalism nor coordinated market economies. They represent instead a 
variety of institutional settings and the contingencies of social and economic 
conflicts over the future path of capitalist development. Such perspectives seem 
particularly relevant for China, given that the country’s relatively successful so­
cial transformation involves ongoing experimentation with and building of new 
social and political institutions that could regulate the manifold contradictions 
of the country’s new capitalist order.14
Much of the present debate mirrors the criticism made by neo-Marxists in 
Europe and North America during the 1980s who adopted the corporatism 
paradigm in critical ways and integrated it into Marxist conceptions of political 
economy, the state, and labor relations. Theorists such as Leo Panitch, Bob Jes- 
sop, and Joachim Hirsch extensively criticized the static character of mainstream 
institutionalist theories of the state, insisting on the capitalist state’s character 
as a social relation and as a “condensation” of complex configurations of power 
within market-based formations of society.15 In other words, the state has lim­
ited ability to “steer” competition and relations of production. The conflicting 
imperatives of “economics” and “politics” between state and civil society are evi­
dent. In the field of labor relations, such an approach can help us understand 
why in modern capitalist societies certain functions of social and political con­
trol are delegated from the state to workers’ or employers’ associations.15
In Germany, several researchers, notably Josef Esser,17 developed a complex 
analysis of trade unions as part of a “corporatist bloc” comprising the world 
market-oriented core groups of German industrial capital and workers’ repre­
sentatives in their respective corporations and sectors. Referring to Poulantzas 
and Gramsci, tripartite coalitions of the management of large corporations, 
trade unions, and government were analyzed by Esser and other researchers as 
the hegemonic core of German capitalism.18 These coalitions define the political 
discourse on key economic and social issues, secure the stability of the German 
economy in times of crisis and accelerated restructuring, and fight the demands 
of new social movements that question the ecological and social virtues of world 
market-oriented modernization. Corporatism, however, becomes increasingly 
selective because deals between unions and employers on downsizing and re­
structuring secure the interests of core workers but leave out the majority of 
less-skilled workers, the unemployed, migrant workers, and women.19
Such approaches effectively shifted the terrain of theoretical analysis. No 
longer could the integrity of the basic institutional actors in labor relations such 
as trade unions, works councils, or employers’ organizations and their respective 
coalitions be taken for granted. Rather, the focus had to be directed to the ques­
tion of how these institutions are reproduced in the context of complex class 
relationships and through social conflicts, movements, and intraorganizational
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contests. Therefore, the social content of corporatist arrangements and deals be­
tween collective actors and their workings, rather than the structure of institu­
tions, became the key subject of interest. The postwar social contract in many 
capitalist countries could be analyzed as a set of trade-offs between “big busi­
ness” and “big labor,” in which workers would relinquish political power and 
control on the shop floor in exchange for institutionally guaranteed participa­
tion in economic growth and productivity increases and organizational stability 
of trade unions.20
From this perspective, the labor process would remain a central terrain of 
contest and consent. Although highly regulated and controlled by bureaucratic 
rules of management and workplace representation, corporatist regulation of 
labor relations would continuously have to be reproduced through day-to-day 
workplace conflicts, in the form of both individual contests and collective strug­
gles. These conflicts would not only be over material benefits and control as such 
but also over the rules of contest and consent at the workplace and in society. 
Any formal or informal deal between management and workers would also en­
tail the implicit or explicit confirmation of the “rules of the game,” as Michael 
Burawoy has extensively analyzed in his concept of the “politics of production.”21
Foundations of Corporatist Labor 
Relations in Germany
In Germany, the rules of consent and contest as well as the basic trade-offs 
between trade unions and capital under corporatist labor relations are embed­
ded in a complex system of workplace and other institutions. The works coun­
cils, mandated by law and elected by all workers in a given workplace (whether 
union members or not), are the basic shop-floor institutions. Industry-wide 
collective bargaining between trade unions and employers’ associations are the 
major supraworkplace institutions. In addition, industrial trade unions are rep­
resented on the board of directors of major corporations (although de facto in a 
minority position) and in scores of government agencies with tripartite govern­
ance, such as in the labor market administration, professional education, welfare, 
health care, and social insurance. Due to the two-tiered structure of workers’ 
representation on the shop floor and in collective bargaining, the German system 
is often referred to as a “dual system of interest representation.”
The nucleus of labor-management cooperation is on the shop floor. It is em­
bedded in the works council system, which dates back to the Works Council Law 
(Betriebsrategesetz) of 1920. Works councils were introduced by a Social Demo­
cratic national government as an alternative to workers’ councils, which had led
